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BITTERSWEET:
A POTENTIAL AVENUE TO INTERNATIONAL TORT LIABILITY
FOR AMERICAN COMPANIES IN THE COCOA SUPPLY CHAIN
Sara Leonhartsberger

I. INTRODUCTION
A staple sweet in American households, chocolate nonetheless leaves
a bitter taste when examining the cocoa supply chain’s ties to child slave
labor.1 As of 2022, a recorded 1.56 million child slave labor cases
occurred within the Ivory Coast cocoa farms 2 where most of the world’s
chocolate originates. 3 With conduct as egregious as slicing ten-year-old
boys’ feet with machetes and putting pepper in the cuts,4 cocoa farms
commit human rights violations that major American chocolate
producers, such as Nestle Inc., effectively condone through continued use
of product and provision of equipment to the farms.5 These violations
have been left unchecked, met only by empty promises from the
American chocolate industry to self-regulate and eliminate child slave
labor.6 Thus, the question remains: What avenues of liability can be
utilized to hold American companies liable for international torts in the
cocoa supply chain?
This Comment analyzes avenues of liability previously used to hold
domestic corporations liable for international torts and proposes a
potential solution to holding American chocolate producers liable for
human rights violations within the cocoa supply chain. First, Section II of
this Comment discusses earlier judicial remedies to liability, culminating
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Nestle Inc. v. Doe.7 Next, Section III
proposes legislation, business model adjustment, and ethical
consumerism promotion as new potential avenues of liability. Finally,
Section IV concludes with the assertion that, in the absence of judicial
remedies, a targeted consumer information campaign is an effective path
towards the elimination of child slave labor within the American
1. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
2. Tony’s 101: Your Guide to Everything You Should Know About Tony’s, TONY’S
CHOCOLONELY [hereinafter Tony’s 101], https://tonyschocolonely.com/us/en/our-mission/tonys-101
[https://perma.cc/64TC-M66A] (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
3. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014).
4. Terry Collingsworth, Nestlé & Cargill v. Doe Series: Meet the “John Does” – The Children
Enslaved in Nestlé & Cargill’s Supply Chain, JUST SEC. (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/73959/nestle-cargill-v-doe-series [https://perma.cc/LLY4-KTUA].
5. Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1017.
6. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
7. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
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chocolate industry.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States’ legal system has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully,
to regulate the international cocoa system through both judicial and
legislative means, both of which will be explored in this Part.8 First,
Section A discusses the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), a judicial9 remedy
that was thought to allow international tort victims to sue domestic
corporations.10 Next, Section B outlines the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991, another judicial remedy that was ultimately found inapplicable
to corporations.11 Section C examines the mandatory labelling regime for
cigarettes as a potential legislative remedy.12 Section D details the
substantive and procedural history of the 2021 case, Nestle Inc. v. Doe.13
Finally, Section E highlights Tony’s Chocolonely, a small chocolate
producer within the industry that, through implementing ethical practices
within the cocoa supply chain, could serve as a model business structure
for larger American chocolate producers, despite a recent development in
the company that raises ethical concerns. 14
A. Alien Tort Statute “Alien Tort Claims Act” 28 U.S.C. § 1350
The ATS was once thought to be the main avenue for implementing
international tort liability against American corporations.15 However,
three Supreme Court cases have considerably curtailed that avenue. 16 The
ATS’s text broadly states: “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in

8. Doe I v. Nestle, S.A.: Ninth Circuit Denies Rehearing En Banc of Case Permitting Domestic
Corporate Liability Claim, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2643 (2020) [hereinafter Ninth Circuit Denies Rehearing],
https://harvardlawreview.org/2020/06/doe-i-v-nestle-s-a [https://perma.cc/F2K8-F66B].
9. While the ATS is a piece of legislation, it is categorized as a judicial remedy in the context of
this Comment because the ATS was thought to enable judicial action in the area of international tort
liability before subsequent Supreme Court decisions foreclosed this reading of the ATS. See discussion
infra Section II(A).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
11. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 451 (2012).
12. 2000 Surgeon General’s Report Highlights: Warning Labels, CDC [hereinafter Warning
Labels], https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2000/highlights/labels/index.htm [https://perm
a.cc/M5TF-LQDX] (last visited February 28, 2022).
13. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
14. Tony’s 101, supra note 2.
15. Ninth Circuit Denies Rehearing, supra note 8.
16. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569
U.S. 108, 111 (2013); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1388 (2018).
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violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”17 The
original text appeared in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 18 a response to
concerns that foreign ambassadors may experience a tort against them
while within the United States and be without a court that could provide
them a legal remedy.19 Some lower courts recognized that foreign
plaintiffs could seek recovery in civil claims under the ATS after
experiencing international human rights violations committed abroad,
leading to the Supreme Court’s concerted effort to clarify and constrain
the application of the ATS.20
1. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the first case to significantly constrain the
ATS, the Court created a test to determine whether a foreign plaintiff
could bring a claim under the ATS.21 Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican
physician, alleged that Sosa, a member of a group of hired Mexican
nationals working with the United States government to capture and
briefly detain Alvarez-Machain in Mexico, was liable to him in a civil
claim under the ATS for a violation of the law of nations.22 Sosa argued
that the ATS was merely a jurisdictional statute, barring courts from
recognizing “any particular right of action without further congressional
action.”23 The Court ultimately held that the ATS was a jurisdictional
statute, limiting federal courts to only hear claims that were “defined by
the law of nations and recognized at common law.”24 The Court pointed
to three tort claims that were explicitly recognized as “against the law of
nations” in 1789: “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights
of ambassadors, and piracy.”25 Thus, the Court held that the ATS could
apply to private claims that fell within those three categories. 26
Consequentially, a two-part test emerged from the Court’s holding in
Sosa: (1) “whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that the alleged violation
is “of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory”27 and (2) whether
allowing the case to proceed under the ATS is a proper exercise of judicial
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
18. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114.
19. Id. at 120.
20. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 890 (2nd Cir. 1980).
21. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723.
22. Id. at 698. These individuals were hired by the Mexican government in response to a request
by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Id.
23. Id. at 712.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 694.
26. Id. at 732.
27. Id. (citing In re Estate of Marcos Hum. Rts. Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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discretion, or instead whether caution requires the political branches to
grant specific authority before corporate liability can be imposed.28 Under
this test, Alvarez-Machain’s claim of arbitrary arrest and detention did
not qualify as a violation against the law of nations to raise an ATS claim,
as he did not demonstrate that his alleged violation was specific and
universal.29 Alvarez-Machain’s claim of arbitrary arrest and detention
was a “general prohibition of ‘arbitrary’ detention defined as officially
sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to detain under the
domestic law of some government, regardless of the circumstances,”
therefore not specific.30 Additionally, Alvarez-Machain did not provide
enough evidence that his claim had ”the status of a binding customary
norm;” therefore, the claim was not universal. 31
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
In the second case limiting the ATS’s application to civil cases, Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, the Court held that the statutory
canon of presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS.32 In
other words, Kiobel found that foreign plaintiffs could not prevail under
the ATS if all the alleged tortious conduct occurred entirely abroad. 33
Because the ATS’s text did not explicitly provide that its jurisdiction
reached conduct entirely “occurring in the territory of another sovereign,”
the Court declined to recognize a claim that would create potential foreign
policy concerns. 34 The Court reasoned that such determinations were
suited for the other political branches.35 Furthermore, the Court held that
“mere corporate presence” in the United States would not suffice to
trigger ATS liability.36
3. Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC
Finally, the third case to substantially constrain the ATS’s application,
Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC, held that a foreign plaintiff could not bring a
claim for the tortious conduct of foreign corporations under the ATS.37
28. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 116-117 (2013) (placing a gloss on the secondfactor of the Sosa test found in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-733).
29. Id. at 732.
30. Id. at 736.
31. Id.
32. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-16 (2013).
33. Id. at 124.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 125.
37. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018).
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The plaintiffs alleged that defendant Arab Bank “allowed the [b]ank to be
used to transfer funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East, which in turn
enabled or facilitated criminal acts of terrorism . . . .”38 The plaintiffs also
asserted that the defendant had used an electronic system for transferring
money within the United States, alleging that the defendant used its New
York branch to both “clear-dollar denominated transactions” and “launder
money” from a Texas-based charity to fund terrorist acts abroad. 39
Applying the two-part Sosa test,40 the Court held that the ATS could not
be extended to foreign corporation liability.41 The Court reasoned that
recent precedents curtailed the judiciary from creating private rights of
action, instead deferring to Congress.42 Further, the Court held that
Congress was the proper political branch for determining whether statutes
imposed corporate liability.43 The Court once again deferred to the other
political branches to extend the ATS’s liability, particularly with the
foreign policy concerns raised regarding whether foreign corporations
could be held civilly liable in the United States for their torts.44
In summation, the combination of Sosa, Kiobel, and Jesner drastically
constrain the ATS to a limited subset of cases.45 Sosa’s two-part test
narrows the types of claims that can rise to an ATS violation.46 Kiobel’s
extraterritoriality presumption forecloses any claim of tortious conduct
that occurred entirely abroad. 47 Jesner’s foreign corporation exclusion
limits the parties that can be named in an ATS violation to individuals or
domestic corporations.48 As a result, the question of how much domestic
conduct would suffice to trigger the ATS against a domestic corporation
involved in international torts was one of the unresolved questions that
sought to be answered in the latter case of Nestle Inc. v. Doe.49
B. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”) was once
considered an avenue to corporate liability for international torts such as

38. Id. at 1393.
39. Id. at 1394-95.
40. Id. at 1399.
41. Id. at 1403.
42. Id. at 1402.
43. Id. at 1403.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1388; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol.
Co., 569 U.S. 108, 111 (2013).
46. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 722-23.
47. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124.
48. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1403.
49. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2021).
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child slave labor.50 Enacted in 1992, the TVPA states that “[a]n
individual, who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation, . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to that individual,”51 and “[an individual who]
subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing, shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any
person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.” 52 The
TVPA includes a ten-year statute of limitations and an exhaustion of
remedies requirement.53 Plaintiffs in lower courts proved successful in
asserting claims under the TVPA in the 1990s, amassing considerable
damage awards.54
Unfortunately, that avenue became nonviable when the Supreme Court
limited the TVPA’s application to human defendants, not organizations.
In Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, the petitioners brought a civil
action under the TVPA for the torture and extrajudicial killing of Azzam
Rahim at the hands of the Palestine Authority and Palestine Liberation
Organization.55 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the TVPA’s
civil action did not extend to organizations because the ordinary meaning
of “individual” in the TVPA does not include organizations.56 The Court
cited to the ordinary use of “individual” connotating natural persons
alone, unlike the term “person” which may indicate natural persons or
corporate entities.57 The Court additionally reasoned that four other uses
of “individual” in the TVPA indicated a singular natural person;
following statutory construction principles, a word’s meaning in a statute
remains consistent, unless explicitly indicated otherwise.58 The Court also
referenced the legislative history of the statute that included explicit
revisions and statements clarifying that the TVPA would not reach
organizations.59 Under this ruling, the TVPA can no longer impose
liability upon corporations for their human rights violations, regardless of
the violations’ degree.60

50. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 451 (2012).
51. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 198 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding plaintiff three million
in compensatory damages for torture from Guatemalan guerrillas under army control involving sexual
assault and being lowered into a pit of corpses).
55. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 449 (2012).
56. Id. at 451.
57. Id. at 454.
58. Id. at 456.
59. Id. at 459-60.
60. Id. at 451.
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C. Mandatory Packaging Warning Labels
Corporate accountability via mandatory warning labels on packaging,
such as those found on cigarette packages, is one avenue of indirect
corporate liability for international torts.61 In 1965, Congress passed The
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 62 This introductory
legislation required a warning to be placed on cigarette packages stating:
“Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.”63
Nevertheless, all that was required under the act was the warning to be in
small print and on one side panel of the box.64 Each successive mandatory
labelling bill, however, required progressively more substantial
warnings.65 The warnings escalated from “Warning: Cigarette Smoking
is Dangerous to Health and May Cause Death from Cancer and Other
Diseases”66 to “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes
Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate
Pregnancy.”67 A final iteration appeared as “SURGEON GENERAL’S
WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury,
Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.”68
In 2009, even stricter labeling requirements became a possibility with
the passage of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act,
allocating to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) the “authority
to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and marketing of tobacco
products.”69 This possibility was realized in March 2020 when the FDA
released the “Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements” rule, mandating “11 new cigarette health warnings,
consisting of textual warning statements accompanied by color graphics
in the form of concordant photorealistic images, depicting the negative
health consequences of cigarette smoking.”70 The new warnings would
61. Warning Labels, supra note 12.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act – An Overview, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
[hereinafter Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act], https://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/rules-regulations-and-guidance/family-smoking-prevention-and-tobacco-control-act-overview
[https://perma.cc/K43U-ZFWZ] (last visited Feb. 28, 2022). The FDA also has the authority to regulate
food and drugs, which implicates the potential for the FDA to regulate chocolate as both a food and a
drug, due to the caffeine present within chocolate. See Caffeine, ALCOHOL & DRUG FOUND.,
https://adf.org.au/drug-facts/caffeine [https://perma.cc/4UU8-JKD2] (last visited Dec. 17, 2022).
70. Cigarette Labeling and Health Warning Requirements, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/labeling-and-warning-statements-tobacco-products/cigarettelabeling-and-health-warning-requirements [https://perma.cc/KDE8-FMN4] (last visited Sep. 19, 2022).
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require these images to compose fifty percent of both the front and back
label of a cigarette carton, a substantial increase from then-current textonly warning labels.71 While the rule will not go into effect until October
6, 2023,72 cigarette manufacturers were required to submit their proposed
labeling designs comporting with the rule by December 7, 2022.73
Consistent with the FDA’s desired effect on consumer consumption,
cigarette label requirements have decreased cigarette usage—to the
detriment of corporate actors.74 In 2019, fourteen percent of American
adults smoked cigarettes regularly.75 According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, that percentage was still high enough for cigarette
smoking to “remain the leading preventable disease and cause of death in
the United States.”76 However, as many as forty-two percent of American
adults smoked cigarettes regularly in 1965, the year the first cigarette
labeling act passed in Congress.77 The American Lung Association’s data
indicates that the rate of tobacco use has steadily decreased each year
succeeding The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965,
from forty-two percent in 1965, to twenty-five percent in 1990, and
eventually to fourteen percent in 2019.78 While other factors such as a
cultural norms shift have had an effect,79 the power of a warning label
requirement on products produced by corporate bad actors should be
recognized.80
D. Nestle Inc. v. Doe
Although its end product is sweet, the chocolate industry’s human
rights violations as seen in Nestle Inc. v. Doe illustrate the bitter origins
of the cocoa used to make much of the world’s chocolate.81 Seventy

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Overall Tobacco Trends, AM. LUNG ASS’N, https://www.lung.org/research/trends-in-lungdisease/tobacco-trends-brief/overall-tobacco-trends [https://perma.cc/G9BC-JRNT] (last visited Feb. 28,
2022).
75. Current Cigarette Smoking Among U.S. Adults Aged 18 Years and Older, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/campaign/tips/resources/data/cigarette-smoking-in-unitedstates.html[https://perma.cc/4MN5-WV9R] (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).
76. Id.
77. Overall Tobacco Trends, supra note 74.
78. Id.
79. Chioun Lee et al., Conscientiousness and Smoking: Do Cultural Context and Gender Matter?,
11 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1, 1 (2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01593/full
[https://perma.cc/KM3X-RMZ5].
80. It could be argued that the product warning label could have influenced the cultural norms shift
in tobacco use, as it provided potential smokers with information dissuading use.
81. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014).
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percent of the world’s supply of cocoa originates from Ivory Coast farms
that implement child slave labor practices. 82 An estimated 1.6 million
children are forced to work under slave labor conditions in the Ivory Coast
and Ghana.83 The six John Doe plaintiffs in Nestle alleged that, as
children, they were kidnapped from a bus stop in their home country of
Mali by professional kidnappers called “locateurs.”84 The plaintiffs in
Nestle ranged from ten to fourteen years old at the time they were
kidnapped.85 One plaintiff observed a farmer paying a locateur the
equivalent of forty dollars for his subsequent three and a half years of
slave labor.86
All the plaintiffs were forced to work up to fourteen-hour days, six days
a week, in grueling conditions on cocoa farms.87 The plaintiffs were
forced to use “machetes to cut down, open, and clean cocoa pods, as well
as apply[] hazardous pesticides and herbicides without any protective
equipment.”88 One plaintiff, John Doe IV, relayed that, after his failed
escape attempt, task masters sliced open his feet with a machete and
placed pepper inside the cuts; this was a customary practice to intimidate
the children to remain on the cocoa farms. 89 Other plaintiffs alleged
observing recaptured children forced to drink their own urine as
punishment.90 All six plaintiffs “were beaten with whips or branches by
their overseers for failing to work fast enough, and several sustained
permanent injuries or scars from these beatings.”91 Working from two to
four years under such conditions,92 all six plaintiffs managed to escape
from the cocoa farms; no one with authority over the farms or any
corporation buying cocoa from the farms intervened on their behalf. 93
Nestle USA, Inc. and Cargill Inc., two American corporations that
dominate the chocolate industry, were named as defendants in Nestle v.
Doe, among others.94 The plaintiffs alleged that both corporations, while
not directly performing the acts against them, enabled and incentivized
the cocoa farmers by forming exclusive buyer/seller contracts with the
82. Id.
83. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
84. Id. While the direct translation of the French word is “landlord,” this term is used in Mali to
refer to the child kidnappers. See Locateurs, WORDSENSE, https://www.wordsense.eu/locateurs
[https://perma.cc/7NNG-NUE8] (last visited April 13, 2022).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014).
88. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014).
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farms.95 Nestle USA, Inc.’s and Cargill Inc.’s prices could only be
obtained through child slave labor; no working adult wage would enable
the desired profit margin. 96 When the House of Representatives passed
legislation in 2001 that would have required U.S. chocolate
manufacturers to “certify and label their products ‘slave-free,”97 the
defendants lobbied against the legislation such that it failed to pass in the
Senate.98 Instead, the defendants, along with other manufacturers in the
industry, vowed to self-regulate, promising to reduce child slavery in the
industry by eliminating any child slave labor in their supply chain.99
However, driven by the desire to keep cocoa prices low and maximize
profits, the initial deadline for elimination of child slave labor in 2005 was
ignored.100 Instead, corporations like Nestle USA, Inc. and Cargill, Inc.
extended their own deadlines not once, but three times. 101 The current
self-imposed deadline is 2025.102 Plaintiffs in Nestle v. Doe, therefore,
sought to enforce international tort liability against companies that, the
plaintiffs claimed, had provided both “personal spending money”103 and
“tools, equipment and technical support to farmers.” 104 Additionally, the
plaintiffs alleged that the companies had made several routine inspections
of the cocoa farms implementing child slave labor.105
To obtain justice for human rights violations perpetuated against them
between 1996 and 2000, the plaintiffs filed their first complaint in
2005.106 They did not receive a Supreme Court decision until 2021.107 The
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the
lawsuit in 2010, holding that the defendants lacked the intent element to
perpetuate child slavery on the farms. 108 Further, the district court held
that the plaintiff’s ATS claim failed because only persons, not
corporations, could be held liable under the ATS.109 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s ruling, instead holding that
corporations could be held liable under the ATS and allowing the
95. Id.
96. Collingsworth, supra note 4.; Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014).
97. Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1017-18.
98. Id.
99. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2018).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
107. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1935 (2021).
108. Nestlé USA v. Doe I, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Nestl%C3%A9_USA_v._Doe_I
[https://perma.cc/8HZ5-CVT5] (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).
109. Id.
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plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.110 After the plaintiffs did so, the
district court again dismissed the complaint, citing the Kiobel
extraterritoriality prohibition under the ATS.111
However, the Ninth Circuit once again reversed the district court,
holding that Jesner’s prohibition of foreign corporations’ liability had not
prohibited a finding of ATS liability for domestic corporations. 112 The
Ninth Circuit held that the alleged conduct of personal spending money
payments, technical support, and inspections of the cocoa farms
perpetuated within the United States from Nestle USA, Inc. and Cargill,
Inc. did not violate the Kiobel extraterritoriality prohibition.113 However,
the Ninth Circuit denied an en banc rehearing.114 The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari to hear the case in 2020,115 consolidating Nestle Inc. v.
Doe with a related case, Cargill Inc. v. Doe et al.116
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Thomas, writing for an eightjustice majority Court, held that the petitioners were barred by Kiobel’s
extraterritoriality prohibition on the ATS, agreeing with the district
court.117 The Court applied a two-step framework to determine if an
extraterritoriality challenge was implicated: (1) after presuming that the
statute only applies domestically, search the statute’s text for an indication
to rebut the presumption118 and (2) if the statute “does not apply
extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that ‘the conduct relevant to the
statute’s focus occurred in the United States.’”119 While the petitioners
argued that Nestle USA, Inc.’s and Cargill Inc.’s actions of providing
personal money and providing technical support and training were
enough to satisfy the domestic requirement for an ATS claim,120 the Court
held that these actions did not suffice as more than “general corporate
activity,” activity which does not trigger an ATS application.121 The Court
then remanded the cases back to the lower courts for further
proceedings.122
110. Id.; Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014).
111. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018).
112. Id. at 1124.
113. Id. at 1126.
114. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 929 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2019).
115. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020).
116. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1935 (2021).
117. Id. at 1936. Justice Alito was the sole dissent, contending that if an individual could be held
liable under the ATS, a domestic corporation could be held liable. His opinion did not reach the merits of
the case. See Nestlé USA, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1950 (Alito, J., dissenting).
118. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2021) (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Cmty., 597 U.S. 325, 337 (2016)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1937.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1940.
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E. A Model Business Structure For The Chocolate Industry:
Tony’s Chocolonely
In direct contravention of any industry arguments that child slave labor
cannot be structurally eliminated within the chocolate industry, Dutch
corporation Tony’s Chocolonely provides a model business structure that
produces chocolate without child slave labor.123 Founded by a Dutch
investigative reporter to prove that the child slave labor practices within
the chocolate industry were not inherently structural, Tony’s Chocolonely
produces several flavors of chocolate, all from ethically-sourced cocoa
beans.124 Since its inception in 2003, the company has implemented five
sourcing principles for slave-free cocoa not only to maintain its ethicallysourced status, but also to encourage other actors in the chocolate industry
to implement a similar strategy.125 These five sourcing principles are as
follows: “traceable cocoa beans, . . . a higher price,” 126 “strong
farmers,”127 “the long term,”128 and “improved quality and
productivity.”129 Each Tony’s Chocolonely label indicates that the
chocolate is produced without child slave labor and discloses the child
slave labor issue in the chocolate industry on the inside label. 130 Instead
of vilifying either the consumer or other chocolate producers, Tony’s
Chocolonely utilizes its disclosures as a call to action for consumers and
producers to join its mission in eliminating child slave labor from the
chocolate industry through structural changes.131
The need for structural changes becomes even more apparent in the
contentious processing method for the otherwise ethical business model
of Tony’s Chocolonely.132 Slave Free Chocolate, an American
123. Our Mission, TONY’S CHOCOLONELY, https://tonyschocolonely.com/us/en/our-mission
[https://perma.cc/6AWA-NTQR] (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
124. Our Mission, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. Id. Chocolate producers would pay a higher price for the beans than the current market value,
allowing farmers to instill ethical labor practices. Id.
127. Id. Tony’s Chocolonely proposes that farmers work in farming collectives, allowing greater
bargaining power and support that could favorably impact the supply chain. Id.
128. Id. Tony’s Chocolonely implements contractual agreements that guarantee farmers at least five
years of paying a higher price for cocoa beans, which allows them stability to instill better labor practices.
Id.
129. Id. Tony’s Chocolonely maintains these steps lead to a better quality in product, which in turn
leads to higher production of beans that can be sold, which leads to more profit and elimination of child
slave labor. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Maarten Veeger, Tony’s Chocolonely uit lijst slaafvrije chocolademakers, RTL NEWS,
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/economie/business/artikel/5214750/tonys-chocolonely-toch-geen-slaafvrijechocolade-cacao-barry [https://perma.cc/BV8G-UNC9] (last visited Dec. 17, 2022). This article is written
in Dutch, but I read a translated transcript.
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organization, removed Tony’s Chocolonely from its list of slave-free
chocolate producers because the owner of the factory that processes
Tony’s Chocolonely’s bars does use child slave labor in its own chocolate
production.133 Tony’s Chocolonely’s owner, while reasserting no child
slave labor was used in its cocoa production, contended that working with
the factory owner furthered Tony’s Chocolonely’s mission in two
ways.134 First, the factory’s large production capability allowed Tony’s
Chocolonely to be produced in greater quantity to spread its message
internationally.135 Second, by working with a larger chocolate producer,
Tony’s Chocolonely could influence the producer to begin the chain of
industry-wide adoption of its business model.136 If other chocolate
providers within the industry implemented an equivalent to Tony’s
Chocolonely’s business model, the ‘need’ other chocolate providers see
for child slave labor would be eradicated, as would the need for smaller
chocolate providers to rely on any part of a system affiliated with child
slave labor.137
III. DISCUSSION
While Nestle Inc. v. Doe’s holding signals the exhaustion of judicial
avenues for holding domestic corporations liable for facilitating
international torts, this Comment proposes legislative, corporate, and
policy solutions for eradicating child slave labor in the chocolate
industry.138 Part A of this Section considers, yet ultimately rejects, a
Congressional legislative act to expand the jurisdiction of the ATS.139 Part
B proposes a labeling act analogous to the mandatory cigarette labeling
acts.140 Part C applies the non-slavery-based business model of Tony’s
Chocolonely to the world’s leading chocolate producers. 141 Part D
suggests an awareness campaign with the goal of facilitating ethical
consumerism.142 Finally, this Comment contends that the maxim
“knowledge is power” can only be effectuated through active attempts to
inform consumers.143

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Section III(C); Veeger, supra 132.
See discussion infra Section III.
See discussion infra Section III(A).
See discussion infra Section III(B).
See discussion infra Section III(C).
See discussion infra Section III(D).
See discussion infra Section III(D).
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A. Congressional Extension of ATS Jurisdiction
A potential response to the judicial foreclosure of using the ATS to
hold American companies liable for international torts could be
Congressional extension of the ATS’s jurisdiction.144 Since Nestle Inc v.
Doe reaffirmed Kiobel’s extraterritoriality prohibition,145 only Congress
has the power to extend the ATS’s jurisdiction.146 Congress would have
to introduce a bill that proposes new language for the ATS that explicitly
indicates an extension of the ATS to reach tortious conduct upon foreign
soil.147 An example of such language could take the form of an additional
sentence specifying that: “A civil action may be heard and adjudicated by
the courts of the United States if the tort is committed within a foreign
principality, as long as the actor violates a treaty or another facet of
international law.” To address the concern of inciting the ire of foreign
sovereignties,148 Congress could also include limiting language, such as:
“For any tort committed within a foreign principality, the actor, whether
an individual or legal entity, must be domiciled within the United States,”
to overcome the extraterritoriality prohibition. As long as the statutory
language is carefully crafted, Congress could reach conduct such as
Nestle USA, Inc.’s and Cargill, Inc.’s without implicating foreign policy
concerns.149
However, Congressional extension of ATS jurisdiction faces what is
likely an insurmountable hurdle of obstacles, making it a nonviable
solution for American corporate liability for international torts.150 For one
thing, twenty-one years of Congressional inaction regarding regulation of
the chocolate industry is unlikely to suddenly result in extension of the
ATS to impose liability.151 In addition, with the Nestle plaintiffs’ recent
attempt to utilize the ATS to impose corporate liability,152 large American
chocolate producers are now on notice to monitor any proposed extension
of the ATS—if such legislation were to be introduced, chocolate
producers would lobby against it.153 Such lobbying, backed by substantial
funding, would likely kill any legislation on the matter. 154 Finally, the
foreign policy concerns that arise in extending jurisdiction over acts
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018).
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2021).
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (2021).
Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1017-18.
Id.
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within foreign sovereignties likely would overtake any other
considerations of extending the ATS.155
B. A Proposed Chocolate Labeling Act
Since extension of the ATS is not a likely path to corporate liability, an
orchestrated information campaign may be the best option for holding the
American chocolate industry accountable.156 The first part in an
orchestrated information campaign to hold chocolate producers liable for
child slave labor practices would be to implement a mandatory chocolate
labeling act (the “Chocolate Act”) via congressional action.157 The
Chocolate Act would be heavily influenced by The Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965158 and its progeny.159 In 1965, the
required labeling was relatively minor in comparison to the product
packaging itself, and the textual warning was similarly mild, stating only
that smoking could have detrimental effects on one’s health.160 In the
chocolate context, a mandatory label could similarly be a smaller
percentage of the packaging, such as a requirement for it to take up no
more than the bottom left corner on the front of a chocolate bar’s label. 161
The legislature could require a warning such as: “This chocolate cannot
be certified as ethically-sourced.”162 Unfortunately, even this relatively
minor requirement could invoke renewed pressure from the American
chocolate industry upon legislators, stalling legislation like the industry
did in 2001.163
Fortunately, two variables have changed within the legislative
landscape since 2001 that may bode favorably for renewed campaigns to
enact mandatory chocolate labeling legislation. First, the FDA can
regulate cigarette labeling and issue robust labeling guidelines. 164 Second,
the chocolate industry has not complied with its own self-regulations.165
With the 2009 Family Smoking Control Act, Congress delegated cigarette

155. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
156. See further discussion infra Section III(D).
157. See discussion supra Section II(C).
158. Warning Labels, supra note 12.
159. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, supra note 69.
160. Warning Labels, supra note 12.
161. Id. The bottom left corner of the front label would still be effective, however, since English
reads left to right, meaning consumers would still take notice of the labeling. Id.
162. While this language would not be as blatant as “This chocolate was produced by child-slave
labor,” it would have a better chance of passing through Congress without the chocolate industry exerting
influence to kill the bill outright. Regardless, even this smaller requirement would receive hostility.
163. See Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2014).
164. Cigarette Labeling and Health Warning Requirements, supra note 70.
165. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
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labeling regulations and enforcement to the FDA. 166 The FDA exerted
further control than any prior Congressional cigarette labeling acts, the
most recent labeling requirements including pictorial representations of
the deteriorating health effects of smoking that will comprise fifty-percent
of the back and front labeling.167 The viability of this alternative currently
rests on pending litigation in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, as the tobacco industry challenges the
validity of the FDA’s authority to promulgate and enforce these
mandatory labels.168
Although dependent on the current tobacco litigation, Congress,
instead of pursuing a legislative labeling act outright, could allocate
chocolate labeling regulation to the FDA because chocolate could qualify
both as an edible product and a drug. 169 If granted express authority to
regulate the labeling of chocolate, the FDA could issue mandatory
labeling requirements, analogous to the mandatory cigarette warning
labeling requirements, that would be effective October 6, 2023.170 In the
chocolate context, the pictorial content could depict child slave laborers
in the cocoa fields, the locateurs assembled in Mali’s bus stops, or,
perhaps most effective, the peppered wounds inflicted on children’s feet,
as John Doe IV alleged occurred to him.171 Suggested textual
requirements include: “Disclosure: This chocolate depends on child slave
labor,” or “Caution: This chocolate could have been produced by
practices depicted on this bar.” Either the implementation or threat of
implementation of comprehensive labelling disclosure could shift the
American chocolate industry’s business model away from child slave
labor.172
Although the graphic pictorial content wrapped on each chocolate bar
would likely be the most effective deterrent, 173 children being the oftintended consumer of chocolate presents a significant contrast to

166. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, supra note 69.
167. Cigarette Labeling and Health Warning Requirements, supra note 70.
168. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company et al. v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration et al. (2020),
PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/litigation-tracker/rj-reynolds-tobaccocompany-et-al-v-us-food-and-drug-administration-et-al-2020 [https://perma.cc/6HRL-QMYL] (last
visited Sep. 16. 2022). The tobacco industry alleges that the FDA has no authority to mandate these labels,
asserting this mandatory speech would violate their First Amendment rights. Id. The litigation is ongoing
in the Eastern District of Texas, and its outcome could have a determinative effect on future proposed
mandatory labels. Id.
169. Chocolate could be categorized as a drug due to the caffeine naturally present. See Caffeine,
ALCOHOL & DRUG FOUND., https://adf.org.au/drug-facts/caffeine [https://perma.cc/4UU8-JKD2] (last
visited Dec. 17, 2022).
170. Cigarette Labeling and Health Warning Requirements, supra note 70.
171. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
172. See discussion supra Section II(C).
173. Cigarette Labeling and Health Warning Requirements, supra note 70.
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cigarettes’ intended consumers—adults.174 Adults, particularly parents,
would likely try to curb any effort to require American chocolate
producers to implement graphic pictorial content on chocolate
packaging. 175 Parents would likely view the FDA’s proposed regulations
as insensitive exposure of disturbing, graphic content to their children. 176
American chocolate producers would lobby heavily against regulations
requiring such an extreme remedy, out of a reasonable fear that backlash
from parents would cause a sharp decline in sales. 177 Instead, a wrapper
with smaller textual elements would be most likely to succeed, though not
without facing some opposition for even that minimal requirement. 178
The second variable that has changed since 2001 is the American
chocolate industry’s failure to implement its own regulations in
eliminating child slave labor from its supply chain.179 Part of the accord
which resulted in the 2001 chocolate labeling bill being tabled included
the chocolate industry’s promise to self-regulate. 180 The chocolate
industry’s promise to eliminate child slave labor from its supply chain by
2005 has been extended every five years since, with industry insiders
already admitting that the newest deadline will also be extended.181 There
is no apparent reason to suspect that the pattern of deadline extensions
will end.182 Because the chocolate industry has failed to honor its promise,
Congress should renew motivation to introduce a mandatory chocolate
labeling bill or expressly empower the FDA to promulgate chocolate
labeling requirements.183 The chocolate industry would be forced to the
bargaining table, as economic and political pressures seem more likely to
effectuate change than egregious human rights violations.184
174. Overall Tobacco Trends, supra note 74.
175. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, supra note 69. While the FDA seeks to
prevent minors from smoking, its regulations are meant to inform the legal consumer base of adults about
the risks associated with smoking. Id. Chocolate varies from this dichotomy, as both age groups consume
chocolate indiscriminately, although chocolate advertising may specifically target children unlike
cigarette advertising. Id.
176. The counterargument, or cruel irony, to this justifiable concern is the continued existence of
that disturbing graphical content for Malian children on cocoa farms. See Collingsworth, supra note 4.
Parents justifiably shelter their children from inhumane brutality, but that brutality will be perpetuated
against other children unless an equivalently drastic remedy advances within the legislative and public
conscience.
177. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2014) (mentioning the much
smaller legislative requirement for a textual disclaimer of “100% slave free” was lobbied against and
effectively killed in the Senate).
178. Id.
179. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
180. See Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1017-18; Collingsworth, supra note 4.
181. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
182. Id.
183. See discussion supra Sections III(A), III(B).
184. See discussion supra Section II(D).
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C. The Chocolate Industry’s Business Model Adjustment
If small chocolate producer Tony’s Chocolonely, through
implementing a multi-step plan for eliminating reliance on child slave
labor within its supply chain, can operate successfully, the American
chocolate industry can follow suit with similar business practices. 185
While an industry-wide business model adjustment following Tony’s
Chocolonely’s model could lead to higher consumer prices, lowered
supply, and an implementation lag, American chocolate producers could
turn these short-term negative outcomes into long-term financial and
reputational gains.186
A major component of Tony’s Chocolonely’s business model involves
chocolate producers paying higher prices for cocoa beans, which enables
farmers to use paid labor.187 In the short-term, larger American chocolate
producers may fear that paying a higher price for cocoa beans will
adversely affect their profits.188 Additionally, if they raise the chocolate’s
prices to reflect the higher price of cocoa beans, chocolate producers will
contend that higher consumer prices would exponentially affect their
profits as consumers would avoid their products.189
In the long-term, however, paying higher prices for cocoa beans could
be used to chocolate producers’ reputational and financial advantage. 190
If they were to raise consumer prices to meet the higher price of the cocoa
beans, chocolate producers could market their products as an ethical
alternative to those producers who do not pay higher prices. 191 If
consumers are informed that higher prices ensure ethically-sourced
products, many consumers would be willing to participate in that
exchange, increasing the producer’s reputation as ethically-mindful.192 If
business model adjustment occurred throughout the industry, a further
effect on the chocolate industry would be price neutralization.193 If higher
prices for cocoa beans became the norm, the price would eventually even
out as every chocolate producer would be paying the same rate to cocoa
farmers.194 Additionally, if all the major chocolate producers
185. Our Mission, supra note 123.
186. Id.
187. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
188. See generally Collingsworth, supra note 4. The reluctance of large chocolate producers to
eliminate child slave labor has traditionally run along similar arguments. Id.
189. Id.
190. Our Mission, supra note 123.
191. Id. While Tony’s Chocolonely instead advocates for the rest of the chocolate industry to join
its ethical practices when it discloses them, other chocolate producers could use disclosure to gain
reputational reward.
192. See discussion infra Section III(D).
193. Our Mission, supra note 123.
194. Id.
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implemented the business model adjustment at relatively the same time,
the overall price of chocolate would rise, eliminating the concern of
competitors’ lower priced chocolate. 195 As America’s staple sweet,
enough consumers would continue purchasing chocolate to alleviate any
remaining price concerns.196
Another concern large American chocolate producers may harbor in
the short-term is a lowered supply of cocoa beans if they can only utilize
ethically-sourced beans.197 Since most of the world’s cocoa beans
originate from the Ivory Coast—the same location as many child slave
labor violations198—large chocolate producers would contend that the
supply of ethically-sourced beans could not meet the demand of chocolate
products in the highly consumptive market.199 A reduced production of
chocolate would, yet again, detrimentally affect production output and
thereby, profit intake.200
In the long-term, however, large American chocolate producers would
be the only actors with enough influence and money in the chocolate
industry to effectuate change within the Ivory Coast. 201 Nestle USA, Inc.
and Cargill, Inc. already provide training, supervision, excess capital, and
tools to cocoa farms that commit human rights violations;202 the
infrastructure exists for them to exert pressure upon these same farms by
only providing those benefits if the farms stop utilizing child slave
labor.203 The perpetuation of a system “requiring” child slave labor only
continues if made viable by the largest buyers within that system.204 If the
largest buyers pulled out of the system, diverting their funds to ethicallysourced farms, the system will ultimately adapt to eliminate the one factor
preventing participation in the profit system: child slave labor. 205
A final concern for both large American chocolate producers and
ethically-minded consumers in the short-term would be an
implementation lag; a business model adjustment that changes the entire
supply chain of an industry would likely take considerable time to
implement.206 In the interim, chocolate producers may have concerns that
if they do not immediately comply with the shift in adjusting, their
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id. See supra Section I.
Id.
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014); Tony’s 101, supra note 2.
See generally Collingsworth, supra note 4.
Id.
Our Mission, supra note 123.
Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1017.
See generally Our Mission, supra note 123.
Id.
Our Mission, supra note 123.
Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

19

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 6

2022]

BITTERSWEET

513

company practices and products could be shunned by now ethicallyconscious consumers.207 Similarly, ethically-conscious consumers may
find themselves uncertain of which chocolate producers have eliminated
or begun to eliminate child slave labor from their business model, leading
to reduced sales for chocolate producers still implementing the necessary
business model adjustment.208 More concerningly, a considerable time lag
could lead to farmers’ retaliation against current child slaves, or to more
children being forced into slavery; measures would have to be taken to
protect against further harm being inflicted in eliminating the source of
that harm.209
Conclusively, the long-term result of the elimination of child slave
labor in the cocoa supply chain outweighs the short-term uncertainty.210
Any step taken by large American chocolate producers toward the
elimination of child slave labor would be a long jump compared to the
twenty-one-year stagnation of empty, self-imposed regulation.211
Chocolate producers could initiate press releases to the public declaring
active steps taken toward business model adjustment.212 Additionally,
producers could indicate on chocolate bar labels that certain product lines
are ethically-sourced, slowly building up their product lines until all
comply with ethically-sourced standards.213 Any and all efforts to
implement a business model adjustment of the chocolate industry,
regardless of the delay, would place the industry closer to child slave labor
elimination than it has ever been. 214
D. Ethical Consumerism Promotion
Another effective deterrent to the continued implementation of child
slave labor in the American chocolate industry would be a targeted
information campaign toward chocolate consumers. 215 If consumers were
informed of the slave labor practices used to produce the chocolate bars
they consume, they would be able to practice ethical consumerism.216

207. See discussion infra Section III(D).
208. Id.
209. See generally Collingsworth, supra note 4. The harms committed against the John Doe
plaintiffs would reoccur the longer the implementation period lags. Id.
210. Our Mission, supra note 123.
211. Collingsworth, supra note 4.
212. Our Mission, supra note 123. The website’s mission statement serves as a public declaration
of its mission and achieved business model. Id.
213. Id. This label inclusion would mirror Tony’s Chocolonely indicating on its label that it is 100%
child slave labor free. Id.
214. See generally Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014).
215. See discussion supra Section III.
216. A Guide to Ethical Consumerism, WORLD VISION CANADA,https://web.archive.org/web/2022
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Potential models for a targeted information campaign could be
nationwide information sessions in schools, analogous to the D.A.R.E.
program, or through human rights advocacy groups sending
representatives to discuss the issue on radio, podcasts, or television news
segments.217 By informing the target consumer base of the human rights
violations that they would be contributing to child slave labor by
continuing consumption, consumers would gain the power to choose
ethically-sourced alternatives or demand accountability from American
chocolate providers.218 The economic loss through product sales decline
and the reputational loss through the exposure of complicity in the current
supply chain would, arguably, bolster the likelihood of labelling
requirements and the chocolate industry’s business model adjustment as
the chocolate industry would become accountable to the consumers who
knew of the atrocities committed in the cocoa supply chain. 219
IV. CONCLUSION
Nestle Inc. v. Doe exemplifies that the American judicial system can
be unexpectedly limited in reaching conduct that most Americans would
find deserving of liability.220 Although actively aware of the human rights
violations that enabled their profits, American chocolate producers’
conduct of providing oversight, funding, and tools used to facilitate child
slave labor proved insufficient to trigger judicial liability under either the
ATS221 or the TVPA.222 With judicial remedies for international torts
perpetuated by domestic corporations effectively foreclosed, another
avenue for international tort liability for American companies must
emerge to address the egregious human rights violations inherent in the
cocoa supply chain.223
Combining legislative, corporate, and policy solutions, a concentrated
consumer information campaign is a promising potential avenue for
holding American chocolate producers liable for child slave labor

0304010521/https://www.worldvision.ca/no-child-for-sale/resources/a-guide-to-ethical-consumerism
[https://perma.cc/KPW9-5XND] (last visited Apr. 29, 2022). Ethical consumerism consists of consumer
behavior dictated by only purchasing products that “are ethically sourced, ethically made and ethically
distributed.” Id.
217. About, D.A.R.E. AM., https://dare.org/about/#MissionVision [https://perma.cc/H4FM-JZCJ]
(last visited Apr. 29, 2022).
218. See generally A Guide to Ethical Consumerism, supra note 216.
219. See discussion supra Sections III(B), III(C).
220. See discussion supra Sections II(A), II(B), II(D).
221. See discussion supra Sections II(A), II(D).
222. See discussion supra Section II(B).
223. See discussion supra Section III.
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practices in the supply chain.224 Legislative mandatory labeling
requirements, if implemented, would inform consumers of the child slave
labor practices that currently run unchecked in the industry. 225 If not
implemented, the threat of legislative mandatory labeling could
incentivize American chocolate producers to implement more changes in
the supply chain than their failed self-regulations.226 Entities within the
chocolate industry that have already eliminated child slave labor from
their supply chains, such as Tony’s Chocolonely, could also serve as a
model for major American chocolate producers. 227 Finally, consumer
information media campaigns targeted at chocolate consumers could
garner the economic and reputational loss that would incentivize the
American chocolate industry to implement systematic changes in the
supply chain.228 In lieu of judicial power, consumer power—ignited by
consumer knowledge—should prove to be a crucial force over the
American chocolate industry.229

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See discussion supra Sections III(B), III(C), III(D).
See discussion supra Section III(B).
See discussion supra Section III(B).
See discussion supra Section III(C).
See discussion supra Section III(D).
See discussion supra Section III(D).
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